Earlier this year I wrote a retrospective on Y2K and said that I'd be back to talk about what is surely the biggest cluster of information risks facing the world over two decades on, namely those associated with the Internet.   Well OK, so it has taken me a couple of months to get around to it but anyway here goes. Threats Malicious individuals Malicious groups Accidents and natural events Vulnerabilities Shared resource Insecure base Naivete  Impacts Extreme dependence Cascading effects Catastrophic outages Preventive controls Detective controls Corrective controls Technical controls Procedural controls Administrative controls  

Other than the classic "Show me", here are a bunch of generic questions to consider, select and refine if you are conducting an ISMS internal audit, IT audit, ISMS management review etc. looking into 'X' (an ISMS, situation, system, process, control, incident or whatever). Hopefully these are thought-provoking, helping you consider and explore X from different perspectives.  Are there any legal, regulatory or contractual compliance implications of X? Are there any other things about X that I/management should know about? Can I do some audit tests on X, please? Compared to Y and Z, how risky/valuable/reliable is X? Does anything strike you as strange or worrying about X? Explain the controls relating to X … Has X ever hurt anyone? What happened? Have you or anyone else raised concerns about X? How big is X - how wide, how heavy, how numerous, how often? How come previous efforts did not fix X? How costly was X?

Information is clearly a valuable yet fragile corporate asset that must be protected against a wide range of threats. Protecting information is complicated by its ubiquity, plus its intangible and ephemeral, dynamic nature, on top of which the information risks are also constantly changing. Furthermore, information risks have to be managed alongside all other risks facing the business, of which there are many. Information risk management is a tough challenge, made still harder if management lacks sufficient, relevant and reliable information concerning the status of information risk management activities, processes, information security etc .   "What  should  we be measuring?" is a common refrain, along with "What are the most common security metrics?". At face value, these are perfectly reasonable and sensible questions. However the first is impossible to answer without knowing more about the organization's situation, while the second is trickier still: scie...

I have railed repeatedly at the vague and often inappropriate or misleading use of 'cyber', in particular cyber-risk and cybersecurity (inconsistently hyphenated, as shown). Usually, cyber simply means IT - all the usual humdrum risks and controls relating to IT systems and networks. This is everyday stuff, nothing special. Plain IT covers it. Sometimes cyber  alludes to far more extreme and sinster threats associated with highly competent and resourceful adversaries sponsored by governments, organised criminals or terrorists attacking critical national or global infrastructures - the sorts of things that might be experienced during war. Those using the term in this way tend to speak in riddles, trying hard to avoid admitting or disclosing vulnerabilities while denying knowledge of any involvement in such activities. 

 Security awareness program can be planned and prioritised on the basis of risks Leave room (flexibility) to respond to opportunities that arise off-plan

It goes with the territory: professionals working in information risk and related areas are, of course, highly aware of risks within our specialism. It's what we do.  Furthermore, many of us would admit to being naturally risk-averse: people outside the profession seem to take chances that we would prefer to avoid or shy away from, whether through plain ignorance or failure to appreciate the risks.   Risk-aversion is a personal characteristic or bias that varies from mild caution and pessimism up to extreme, debilitating paranoia. It doesn't necessarily mean that we are timid, scared or weak, rather that we tend to place more emphasis on the possibility of problems or incidents compared to non-risk-averse people.    

  Yesterday, I wrote about preparing and promoting your budget proposal, strategy, programme of projects or an individual initiative, gaining management support and negotiating for approval. Today I'd like to emphasis a fleeting, easily overlooked step in your journey, an opportunity to do even better. At the very moment when the negotiations are completed and management finally agrees your infosec budget, their interest, motivation and support for it is high ... so, before the dust settles, why not seize the moment: a window of opportunity has opened. Before long, the wave of enthusiasm will subside and management's focus will turn to other matters. 

  Are you responsible for your organisation's information risk and security or cybersecurity budget? Are you busily putting the finishing touches to your FY 2023 budget request? Budgeting is a stressful management task, figuring out the figures and anticipating tough battles ahead leading (usually) to a disappointing outcome and yet more problems resulting from inadequate investment. With  clear signs of another global recession looming (as if COVID, climate change and the war in Ukraine weren't challenging enough already), tightened belt-buckles are the order of the day*.

... “a related set of IT equipment and software used for the processing, storage or communication of information and the governance framework in which it operates” [source:  New Zealand Information Security Manual ] ... "all connected parts of the organisation that may be at risk of a cyber attack" [thanks Steven Os] ... a set of computers plus their software, users, administrators and managers, the associated policies and procedures, plus the links to connected systems, plus the operating environment, all of which are required to deliver services ... ... “ a combination of interacting elements organised to achieve one or more stated purposes ” [source:   ISO/IEC 27036-1 , notes omitted, also  NIST SP800-161r1 & SP800-53r5] ... a black box within which inputs are mysteriously converted to outputs ... "an integrated suite of related items and processes forming a discrete operating or functional unit, such as a management system" [source:  SecAware glossary ] ...

Two and a half years ago in March 2020 as we were fast approaching our first lockdown, I published the following P robability I mpact G raph depicting my analysis of the information risks relating to COVID: The PIG reports the information risks I identified at the time, thinking about COVID from the general societal perspective as opposed to a personal or organisational perspective.

  We're on a mission to convince every organisation that managing information risks properly is more than just a compliance imperative.  It's good for business. Is your organisation looking to raise its security game? Are managers worried about ransomware, privacy breaches and intellectual property theft, especially now with so many of us working from home?  What about the business continuity risks with supply chains stressed to breaking point by COVID, recession and war? Are your suppliers cutting corners on privacy and security, hoping nobody will notice? Are desperate competitors taking advantage of the disruption to undermine your cyber-defences? Worse still, is management blissfully unaware of the issues, with everyone heads-down, rowing hard, too busy to notice the icebergs dead ahead? ... Or is there a strong drive to secure  and  exploit information as an integral part of operations? Does being trusted by customers and stakeholders equate to brand value,...

I can think of eight key advantages and opportunities in adopting the new third edition of ISO/IEC 27001 as opposed to the second edition nearly a decade old:

There are clearly substantial information risks associated with the redaction of sensitive elements from disclosed reports and other formats, risks that the controls don't necessarily fully mitigate. Yes, controls are fallible and constrained, leaving residual risks. This is hardly Earth-shattering news to any competent professional or enlightened infidel, and yet others are frequently shocked.  A new report* from a research team at the University of Illinois specifically concerns failures in the redaction processes and tools applied to  PDF documents . The physical size of redacted text denoted (covered or replaced) with a variable-length black rectangle may give clues as to the original content, while historically a disappointing number of redaction attempts have failed to prevent the original information being recovered simply by removing the cover images or selecting then pasting the underlying text. Doh!

... a cluster of international standards on information security management and related topics ... derived from British Standard BS 7799, itself based on an information   security  manual generously donated to the UK government's Department of Trade and Industry by the fuel company Shell International ... the product of  ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 SubCommittee 27

Having done, seen and learnt a lot in the course of working with the ISO27k standards and precursors since the mid-90's, I'm keen to share my accumulated knowledge with those of you who are relatively new to the field, just setting out and perhaps struggling to get to grips with it all. You needn't learn everything the hard way like I did: I can help you move ahead smartly, avoiding tar pits, finding taller ladders and shorter snakes.

Like ambient music (muzak, elevator tunes), ambient information security blends into the background.  The idea is that infosec controls are subtle, seamless, integral parts of whatever is going on, as opposed to blatant in-yer-face shouty SECURITY. Of course it's not always possible, and there are circumstances where the visibility of security is itself a valuable part of the controls - deterrents, for example, warning signs, distinct boundaries and the menacing presence of beefy security guards, with guns, dogs and attitude.   Personal identification and authentication processes that require user interaction are hard to miss e.g. security passes/tokens, passwords, PIN codes, SMS codes and all that rigmarole. Nevertheless, there are choices for system/security architects when designing login mechanisms that affect the amount of time and effort required from each user.   Those are the exceptions. A majority of security controls go largely unnoticed. Federate...

Prompted by a random podcast comment and inspired by a productive day in the garden, here's an analogy between governance and gardening. 

... "s trategic frameworks, organisational structures, policies and processes used to guide/direct, oversee/monitor and to some extent control the organisation, ensuring that it fulfils its strategic objectives and complies with internal and external obligations" [source:  SecAware glossary ] ... applicable to corporations, organisations, nations, the globe, industries, business units, finance, the environment, governments, projects, land, health, steam engines, watches, IT, information , information risk and security ... ... for the benefit of stakeholders, owners, regulators, authorities, society ... designing and implementing appropriate corporate structures

'6.3 Planning of changes' is a succinct new clause in ISO/IEC 27001:2022, one accidentally omitted from the contents listing (oops). Simply put, changes to the Information Security Management System must be planned, rather than simply happening haphazardly. What kinds of ISMS changes would this cover? Without further clarification, it could be argued that any and every change to the ISMS has to be "carried out in a planned manner", begging further questions about the intended purpose and scope of the clause, and of the ISMS itself.  If we add a new topic-specific information security policy on IoT, for instance, or update the risks list, would such changes need to be planned? How about simply renaming the organisation's list of risks to, say, Information Risk Register - should that be planned? Would correcting a little typo in an ISMS procedure or awareness item count as an ISMS change that has to be planned? 

... "adverse change to the level of business  objectives achieved" [source:  ISO/IEC 27000 ] ... the inertial energy imparted by a moving mass impinging upon an object ... "t he adverse outcome or consequences caused by or arising from an information security incident , leading to direct and/or indirect (consequential) losses/costs to the organisations and/or the individuals concerned" [source:  SecAware glossary ] ... the point when probability functions collapse ... when possibility becomes reality ... when threat meets vulnerability ... short, medium and long-term ... loss of control over an asset ... too late to prevent or avoid ... being smacked in the head ... when p (occurrence) hits 1 ... when gloved fist hits chin ... what we tried to prevent ... what we sought to avoid ... an impressive entrance ... the resonance of a bell ... when risk eventuates ... when shit meets fan ... not too late to react ... being compromised ... a successful attack ... the p...

... " an inherent and potentially exploitable weakness in an information asset, system, process, organisation etc."   [source:  SecAware glossary ] ... exposed by one or more missing, ineffective or inadequate  controls ... “a security weakness in a computer” [source:  NIST SP800-114 rev1 ] ... “a weakness, susceptibility or flaw of an asset or control that can  be exploited by one or more threats” [source: Financial Stability Board  Cyber Lexicon ] ... "weakness of an asset or  control  that can be exploited by one or more  threats ”  [source:  ISO/IEC 27000 ] ... "weakness in a system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat" [source:  NIST SP 1800-17b ] ... a chink in the armour ... a gap in our defences ... revealed in incidents ... asking for trouble ... taking a chance ... misplaced trust ... the wea...

Given research indicating that security culture trumps security policies , how can we strengthen the corporate security culture? Here are a few ideas to set you thinking:

A note on LinkeDin led me to an intriguing scientific research study that tested the following five hypotheses: People who receive instructions via a written policy about rules will have better knowledge of these rules than those that do not.  People who receive a shorter form version of policy about the rules with less text will have better knowledge of the rules than those who receive a longer training form.  People who receive a written policy outlining the rules in a more vernacular and less legal technical language will have better knowledge of the rules than those presented with a more formal-legal-styled training text.  People with better knowledge of rules will also comply more with such rules. The more legal rules align with people’s personal and social norms, the higher people score in their knowledge of these legal rules.  

... "any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service"  [source:  NIST SP800-30r1 ] ... "a person, situation or event (whether deliberate or accidental, targeted or generic in nature) that is hazardous or dangerous, capable of causing an  information   security  incident" [source:  SecAware glossary ] ... "potential cause of an unwanted incident, which can result in harm to a system or organization" [source:  ISO/IEC 27000:2018 ] ... a competitor's unexpected shift of tactics ... an ominous promise to cause harm ... an accident waiting to happen ... the cause of a  really  bad day ... nature red in tooth and claw ... storm clouds on the horizon .....

  Finally! Data in a  report by Cyentia confirms my bias!

... "various forms of supervision and inspection used to ensure that important information security activities and controls are operating properly, and to identify any anomalies" [source:  SecAware glossary ] ... "forgetfulness, carelessness, neglect or incompetence, typically leading to errors, omissions and other information security incidents" [source:  SecAware glossary ] ... absent from ISO/IEC 27002 except for one measly mention (clause 5.16) ... maintaining a watching brief ... an opportunity to review ... the four eyes principle ... the act of overseeing ... the prompt to revisit ... keeping a close eye ... hands off, eyes on ... something missed ... a sign of dis trust ... an opportunity ... a vulnerability ... a sign of  trust ... incompetence ... management ... carelessness ... an omission ... an accident ... an override ... supervision ... inspection ... ineptitude ... a problem ... assurance ... a mistake ... authority ... guidance ... a control ... che...

... "provision of a certain level of trust, confidence, confirmation or proof of something, typically by reviewing, checking, testing, certified compliance or auditing it" [source:  SecAware glossary ] ... knowing when to stop climbing the ladder ... the absence of anxiety and doubt ... a necessary part of management ... the result of testing - pass or fail ... swimming out of the shark cage ... an integral governance function ... stepping into the shark cage ... packing your own parachute ... a friendly hand reaching out ... engineering the shark cage ... an underappreciated goal ... an undervalued objective ... certifying the shark cage ... welding the shark cage ... confidence in another ... an independent view ... holding all the cards ... a measure of power ... plausible deniability ... taking a space walk ... stacking the deck ... hitting the mark ... being confident ... a winning hand ... self-confidence ... not insurance ... being certain ... confirmatory ... bearing ...

Since October is cybersecurity awareness month in the USA, we've seized the opportunity to update SecAware.com with additional information on our security awareness material.  SecAware's information security awareness modules explore a deliberately wide variety of individual topics in some depth:

  Like an expectant father, I've been anxiously filling-in time before the publication of ISO/IEC 27001 :2022, due any day now. Today, I completed the tedious process of reviewing/updating all our information security policy templates for SecAware.com . 

SEE UPDATE 19th Feb 2023 The third edition of ISO/IEC 27001 will have a few changes in the main body text and a complete replacement for Annex A based on  ISO/IEC 27002:2022 .     The transition arrangements are still uncertain but this is my understanding at this point:

... "a structured assurance process of examination, review, assessment, testing and reporting by one or more competent and trusted people who – crucially – are independent of the subject area being audited" [source:  SecAware glossary ] ... senior management's not-so-secret weapon ... how to use friends and influence people ... how to lose friends and alienate people ... proof that management distrusts us ... where failed accountants go to die ... seeing things through fresh eyes ... a massive and unnecessary cost ... "Go ahead punk, make my day" ... derived from the Latin audio ... forever re-opening old sores ... like a bear with a sore head ... the skin-hardening function ... watching your every move ... dependent on information ... bayonetting the wounded ... the bottom of the barrel ... the third line of defence ... something best avoided ... always late to the party ... policies and procedures ... asking dumb questions ... lurking in the shadows ... a gove...